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STATE OF UTAH 
WHITMORE OXYGEN COl\fP ANY, 
PZaintiff, 
vs. 
STATE TAX COMl\1ISSION, GRANT 
A. BROWN, ELISHA WARNER, 







The facts in this case are not in dispute and plain-
tiff's statement as outlined in its brief is substantially 
correct and is adopted by defendants for the purpose of 
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this brief. This case was submitted to the Commission 
on an agreed statement of facts (Tr. 32-34), which out-
lines the pertinent facts in greater detail. 
QUESTIONS INVOLVED 
It is believed that the questions as outlined in plain-
tiff's brief do not set forth the prohlems herein with 
sufficient exactness and, therefore, it is submitted that 
the specific questions for determination are as follows: 
1. Does the filing of form TC 71 entitled ''Sales 
and Use Tax Return," consisting of two parts 
in which entries relating to sales tax have 
been made in the sales tax portion of the 
form but in which entries have not been made 
in the use tax portion of the form, constitute 
a use tax return for the purpose of starting 
the period of the statute of limitations for 
collecting a use tax deficiency determina-
tion~ 
2. Was the sa:le of personal property evidenced 
by the Whitmore-Linde contract an inter-
state sale, an Indiana sale, or a sale made in 
Utah~ 
3. If such sale is determined to be an Indiana 
sale is the use made by the Whitmore Oxygen 
Company of these cylinders exempt pursuant 
to the provisions of Title 80-16-4 (d), Utah 
Code Annotated, 1943, because subject to the 
Gross Income Tax Act of Indiana~ 
REPLY TO PLAINTIFF'S ARGUMENT 
1. Plaintiff predicates its argument as to the first 
question on the fact that it filed form TC 71 with the 
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Tax Conunission every two months and that each return 
was certified to by the company (Tr. 35), and further 
contends that the forn1 as filed by it constituted a use 
tax return within the meaning of the Use Tax Act. 
If the fonns as filed by plaintiff can be considered 
to be a return for the purpose of the Use Tax Act, its 
contention that the statute of limitations is a good de-
fense, must be conceded. It is the position of defend~nts 
that the 4 year statute of limitation applies for the as-
sessment of use tax deficiencies in cases where a use tax 
return has been filed. Title 80-16-18, Utah Code Anno-
tated, 1943, allows the Commission to bring an action 
at any time within-± years after any person is delinquent 
in payment of use tax. While there is no specific statute 
of repose with regard to the making or the finding of a 
deficiency assessment by the Commission, it is believed 
that the only reasonable interpretation of the Act as a 
whole would be that the general 4 year statute of limita-
tions (104-2-30, Utah Code Annotated, 1943) applies in-
asnluch as an action could be brought within this time. 
The required contents for use tax purposes is set 
forth in Title 80-16-7, Utah Code Annotated, 1943, which 
requires the taxpayer to "* * * file with the Commission 
/ 
a return for the preceding bimonthly period in such form 
and containing such information as may be prescribed 
by the Commission. * * * '' With regard to the use tax, 
the Conunission has issued its form TC 71-B entitled 
''Instructions,'' and lists the purpose of the combined 
return to be as follows: 
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''Since a considerable number of retailers 
will be required to return to the State the use 
tax with respect to certain of their sales, as well 
as being subject to the use tax on certain of their 
purchases, in addition to being liable for return-
ing sales tax, a combined return has been pre-
pared so that both the sales tax and the use tax 
may be reported on one return.'' 
Items 6 and 7 on form TC 71 filed by the plaintiff 
herein ( Tr. 35) are completely blank. Instructions with 
regard to Items 6 and 7 reads as follows: 
"Item 6. Enter as this item the total sales 
price as tangible personal property the storage, 
use or other consumption of which, in Utah, is 
subject to the use tax. For the most part, this 
will include the sales price of property on which 
delivery is made from an out-of-state point to 
purchasers in Utah which ordinarily would be the 
same as Item 13 in the schedule of sales tax de-
ductions. This will also include the sales price of 
property, the sale or delivery of which is made at 
a place outside of this State if the property is 
purchased for storage, use or other consumption 
in this State. The use tax does not apply to the 
sales price of property the sale of which is sub-
ject to a sale or excise tax of this State or any 
other state. 
"Item 7. Enter as this item, valued at the 
sales price, all purchases made by you outside of 
Utah or in interstate commerce for storage, use 
or consumption by you in this State upon which 
the seller has not collected the use tax. For the 
most part, this item will include equipment, sup-
plies, merchandise, etc., purchased from out-of-
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5 
state sellers. It should not include (a) merchan-
dise purchased for resale; or (b) materials which 
become an ingredient or component part of tang-
ible personal property to be sold.'' 
'Yhile it may be true that the filing of a return 
containing incorrect infonnation in the absence of fraud 
will be sufficient to start the running of the limitation 
period, if a ta..,"'(payer fails to furnish any information 
with respect to requir~d items as set forth in the in-
structions, and leaves the form blank as did the plain-
tiff herein, it is submitted that a return has not been 
filed within the meaning and intent of the Use Tax Act. 
No direct judicial authority has been found on this 
subject and it is believed that there is no reported case 
in which this specific question h~s been determined. 
However, Federal cases interpreting sections 51 (a), 52, 
142 (a), and 187 of the Internal Revenue Code and their 
earlier counterparts relating to Federal income tax re-
turns are somewhat analogous. These sections require, as 
in prior Revenue Acts, a return ''stating specifically the 
items of gross income and the deductions and credits al-
lowed under this title,'' and also ''such other information 
for the purpose of this title as the Commission with the -
approval of the Secretary may by regulations pr~scribe.'' 
In Florsheim Bros. Dry Goods Company v. United 
States (1930) 280 U.S. 453, 460, Mr. Justice Brandeis 
speaking for a unanimous court stated: 
''The burden of supplying by the return the 
information on which assessments were to be 
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based was thus imposed on the taxpayers. And, 
in providing that the period of limitation should 
begin on the date the return was filed, rather 
than when it was due, the statute plainly mani-
fested a purpose that the period was to com-
mence only when the taxpayer had supplied this 
information in the prescribed manner.'' 
In Corona Co,al and Coke Co., (1928) 11 B.T.A. 240, 
where no information was given except the name and ad-
dress of the taxpayer, and only. the word "none" was 
written at the blank space provided for net income, a simi-
lar holding was reached. See also The Jockey Club (1934) 
30 B.:T.A. 670, aff'd. without discussion of this point. 
(C.C.A. 2d 1935). 76 F. 2d 597 (blank return acc0mpanied 
by letter claiming exempt status) ; National Oontnactilng 
Co. (1938) 37 B.T.A. 689, aff'd. (C.C.A. 8th 1939) 105 
F. 2d 488 (two return forms filed neither of which was 
held sufficient); The Joh!n D. Alkire Investment Co. v. 
Nicholas (C.C.A. lOth 1940) 114 F. 2d 607 (corporation 
return showing no income or deductions, and not dis-
closing that assets of the corporation had been conveyed 
in trust was held not sufficient). 
Such cases as Zellerbach Pape.r Co. v. Helverilng 
(1934) 293 U.S. 173 cited by the plaintiff and Myles Salt 
Co. v. Commissioner (C.C.A. 5th 1931) 49 F. 2d 232, do 
establish the rule that perfect accuracy or completeness 
.is not necessary to rescue a return from nU'llity. It is to 
be noted, however, that in each of these and similar cases, 
while the return filed may not have been accurate or 
complete it did contain entries of the kind required to 
be included in the returns by Federal law. 
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Plaintiff herein filed forms upon which the entries 
were addressed to but one of two separate tax liabilities, 
and it did not comply with the requirements of the Com-
mission's instructions on Form TC 71-B. The plaintiff's 
circumstances are thus closely akin to those in the recent 
case of Commissioner c. Lane Wells Co. (1944) 321 U.S. 
219, 88 L. Ed. 684, wherein it was held that the fi:ling of 
an inc01ne tax return upon which a corporation errone-
ously but in good faith denied it was a personal holding 
company would :ilot operate to start the limitation period 
against an assessment of the surtax imposed upon per-
sonal holding companies, if a separate personal holding 
company return w~s not filed. See also McDon!fiAell v. 
Unite·d States (Ct. Cl. 1932) 59 F. 2d 29·5 (partnership 
filed income tax return, but no excess profits tax return); 
Rockland and Rockport Lime Corp. v. Ham (D.C. Maine 
1930) 38 F. 2d 239 (corporation filed income tax return 
but no excess profits tax return). 
It is submitted that the forms filed with the de-
ficiency were insufficient to start the running of a limita-
tion period for use tax deficiency determinations. We 
submit that the application of the instructions given in 
TC 71-B and the Lane Wells Company case to the instant 
case, calls for a negative answer to question No. 1. Plain-
tiff argues that form TC 71 purports to be on its face 
a single return of sales and use tax and points to the 
designation and certification on the form to substantiate 
its ~position. Such argument, we submit, is beside the 
point for clearly the form was addressed to two separate 
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tax liabilities. This was made evident by the fact that 
the form itself provides 8paces for separate computation 
of the sales tax and of the use tax and by specific in-
structions for Items 1 and 2 for the sales tax, and Items 
6 and 7 for the use tax (Tr. 35). 
Items 6 and 7 on form TC 71 refers specifically to 
instructions ( Tr. 35). Of great significance are these ex-
press instructions given to taxpayer wherein the required 
content~ of a return for use tax purposes are set forth. 
As to the certification, could the plaintiff seriously con-
tend that a completely blank form except for signatures 
is a return for sales tax~ It follows that a form contain-
ing no information for use tax purposes as required by 
law and the instructions of the Commission would be a 
nullity with regard to the use tax despite the language of 
the certification. This construction is supported by the· 
various Federal tax cases heretofore cited since the Fed-
eral law required verification of the forms filed and pre-
sumably the requirement was followed. 
It is submitt~d that the Federal statutes r(lquiring 
a return ''stating specifically the items of gross income 
and the deductions and credits allowed" are com.parable 
to the instructions given by the Commission which re-
quire that a return for use tax purposes shall include 
"* * * all purchases made by you outside of Utah or in 
interstate commerce for storage, use or consumption by 
you in this state upon which the seller has not collected 
the use tax. * * * '' and '' * * * total purchase price of 
tangible personal property purchased for storage, use, or 
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other consun1ption in this state on which the seller has 
not collected Sales or lh;e Tax." (Item 7-Tr. 35.) The 
Federal taxes and the use tax are both based upon self 
assessinent and in both instances the purpose is not to 
obtain inforn1ation in some form but to obtain it with 
uniformity and completeness to facilitate handling and 
certification. See Commissioner v. Lane Wells Co., supra. 
The use tax i~ compliinentary to the sales tax, but 
it is also true that the excess profits tax was compli-
mentary and supplementary to the usual tax on cor-
poration income as was the surtax imposed on personal 
holding companies involved in the Lane Wells Co. case. 
We submit that the Federal authorities are appro-
priate here and that the language such as found in the 
John D. Alkire Inves1tment Co. v. Nicholas (C.C.A. lOth 
1940) 114 F. 2d 607 at 610, is significant. It is stated 
therein: 
"The taxpayer no longer contends that the 
rentals did not represent gains for which it was 
subject to be taxed. Its sole contention now is 
that the deficiency assessments were barred by 
the statutes of limitations-the three year period 
from the filing of the return provided in the Rev-
enue Act of 1926, and the two year period pro-
vided in the subsequent acts. That contention 
turns upon whether the returns currently made 
for the years :ln question were returns within the 
meaning of the statutes of limitation. 
''Sections 239 and 52, supra, respectively, re-
quired every corporation to make a return 'stat-
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ing specifically the items of its gross income and 
the deductions and credits allowed * * *.' The 
burden was thus cast upon the taxpayer to furnish 
by return the information on which assessments 
were to be n1ade. And by providing that the period 
of limitation should begin to run from the filing 
of the return, the statute Inanifested a clear 
legislative intent that the period should begin 
only when the taxpayer had furnished such in-
formation in the manner prescribed. Florsheim 
Bros. Co. v. United States, 280 U.S. 453, 50 S. 
Ct. 215, 7 4 L. Ed. 542. 
''Meticulous accuracy, perfect completeness, 
or absence of any ommission is not exacted. But 
a return which fails to comply in a substantial 
degree with the requirements of the statute in 
respect to disclosing the requisite information 
essential to the making of assessments does not 
suffice to start the period of limitation." 
Plaintiff indicates in its argument that a different 
rule should apply to it because it apparently r..cted in 
good faith. This is the precise contention which was made 
and rejected in Commission v. Lane Wells Co., supra, 
which we have heretofore mentioned. There, as here, 
the taxpayer acted in good faith and contended that a 
return addressed to but one of its two tax liabilities was 
sufficient to answer the purpose of both, but to no 
avail. 
Plaintiff further argues that this case demonstrates 
the harshness of a rule which would allow the Commis-
sion to make this deficiency assessment. Plaintiff pre-
sumably argues that the policy consideration should ab-
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solve it from tax. Such an argument, it is submitted, is 
totally without merit, or if it has merit, should be ad-
dressed to the Legislature and not to the Court. There· 
is in sustaining the defendants position here the sound 
principal of preventing unjust discrimination in the ap-
plication of tax statutes. If taxes may be evaded by the 
simple expedient of non payment or failure to make a 
return, then the entire revenue system of the stat~ would 
be completely disrupted. Especially is this true of the 
self assessed taxes of which the use tax is only one. In 
all of these taxes the state relies upon the taxpayers to 
comply voluntarily with its laws and instructions. If he 
does not, the state cannot with any degree of efficiency 
and economy maintain a staff of auditors sufficiently 
large to ascertain each default. And further, when we 
speak of the public we must remember that each member 
of the public is to some extent a taxpayer. That which 
reduces the tax burden of one merely increases the tax 
on others and the benefits received by one individual tax-
payer is to the detriment of the remaining taxpayers. In 
other words, the basic policy of the state is to secure the 
payment of tax and by sound collection policy to prevent 
evasion. 
Of the thousands of taxpayers who are required to 
file form TC 71, the vast majority complete only that 
portion of the return which applies to the sales tax. It 
is only because some taxpayers are required to file both 
sales and use tax that the Commission adopted a com-
bined sales and use tax return. The Commission has con-
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12 
sistently, since the adoption of form TC 71, taken the 
view that where the use tax portion of the return is left 
blank that such return does not constitute a return for 
use tax purposes. As pointed out by :Mr. Justice Cordoza, 
and by plaintiff in its brief on ·page 7, perfect accuracy 
is not required. This rule we have applied to the sales 
tax portion of plaintiff's return (Tr. 35), wherein cer-
tain questions were not answered by taxpayer. However, 
it is our position and we believe such position to be sub-
stantiated by both Federal cases and long administra-
tive interpretatjon, that some indication must be made 
on form TC 71 to apprise the Commission and its auditors 
of the fact that the ta:x:payer claims no use tax to be due 
or an amount certain to be due. 
Plaintiff suggests that "The law does not require a 
person to do a useless thing." ·(Plaintiff's brief, page 
6.) With this general principal of law, we, of course, 
agree. However, we have pointed out that such principal 
has no application here. To indicate to the Commission 
taxpayer's status wHh regard to the use tax is not a use-
less act. Some affirmative representation of non-liability 
must be made because of the inherent ambiguity existing 
if no entry of any kind is made. 
Plaintiff points out to the court that the sales tax 
and use tax are closely related and the taxpayer cannot 
be called upon to distinguish carefully between each 
tax separately. This, as a general rule, is also true, and 
where it is admitted that one of the two taxes is of 
necessity applicable to a transaction, little is to be gained 
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by Inaking such distinction. This principal, however, has 
absolutely no application in the case now before the 
court. It might be applicable if in an audit of the Linde 
Air Products Con1pany the question arose as to whether 
Linde should return the tax collected, if collected, as a 
sales or use tax. In such case it would not be necessary 
to distinguish between the taxes. Here, however, it is ad-
mitted that '"No sales or use tax has been paid by the 
"\Yhitmore Oxygen Company to the state of Utah or any 
other state upon said purchase." (Tr. 33.) We take the 
position that in view of instructions to Item 7 herein-
before set forth that taxpayer would have had no diffi-
culty in determining that a u~e tax was due on the pur-
chase of the cylinders. 
We submit, therefore, that in view of the foregoing 
authorities and arguments that the only reasonable in-
terpretation of the law with regard to the question here-
in presented is that some affirmative indication must be 
made on the combined sa-les and use tax return and that 
where the use tax portion of the form is left completely 
blank, that such is not sufficient to start the running 
of the period of the statute of limitation. 
2. Proceeding now to the second question, we must 
determine whether the sale of the cylinders herein in-
volved is an interstate sale, an Indiana sale, or a sale 
made in Utah. The discussion of plaintiff as to where 
title to these cylinders passed is of no consequence. The 
passage of title is in no ~vent the taxable incident in this 
contract whether it be sales or use tax. The sole reason 
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14 
that title passed within the state of Utah, as evidenced 
by paragraph 4 of the contract (Tr. 38), was to reserve 
title in the vendor until the purchase price was paid in 
full. 
There is no reported case which has come to coun-
sel's attention holding that the passage of title is the 
taxable incident for sales or use tax purposes in a con-
tract wherein title is reserved to insure the payment of 
the price. Title 80-16-2 (c), Utah Code Annotated, 1943, 
defines ''purchase'' as follows : 
"'Purchase' means any transfer, exchange 
or barter, conditional or otherwise, in any man-
ner or by any means whatsoever, of tangible per-
sonal property for a consideration. A transaction 
whereby the possession of property is transferred 
but the seller retains the title as security for the 
payment of the price shall be deemed a pur-
chase.'' 
The plaintiff has cited Title 80-15-2 (b), Utah Code 
Annotated, 1943, which is a substantially similar pro-
vision in the Sales Tax Act. (Plaintiff's brief, page 11.) 
Plaintiff concludes :with regard to these provisions that 
they '' * * * can affect only the tax basis and not the 
tax incident as the tax incident, regardless of where or 
when title or possession passes, is the use, storage, or 
consumption of property in Utah.'' 
80-16-3, Utah Code Annotated, 1943, levies the use 
tax '' * * * on the storage, use· or other consumption in 
this state of tangible personal property purchased * * * 
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for storage, use or other consumption in this state***." 
This section further provides that '·Every person stor-
ing, using or otherwise consun1ing in this state tangible 
personal property purchased shall be liable for the tax 
imposed by this act, and the liability shall not be ex-
tinguished until the tax has been paid to this state." 
Clearly, then, the tax in the instant case is imposed on 
the use in Utah and the transfer of possession is a 
purchase made by the plaintiff of these cylinders for 
use in Utah. It is believed that the controversy with 
regard to where the sale herein took place may be settled 
simply by pointing out that the use of property pur-
chased here or elsewhere is liable to the use tax unless 
specifically exempted. 
This court in the case of Southern Bacific Company 
v. Utah State T.ax Commission (1944) 150 Pac. 2d 110, 
106 Utah 451, at page 455, pointed out that "Unless ex-
empted under the provisions of 80-16-4, of the act or pro-
hibited by constitutional ·provisions, the use, storage, or 
other consumption of tangible personal property in Utah, 
purchased here or elsewhere is liable to the use tax." 
(italics supplied.) 
The sales tax and the use tax, as pointed out, are 
complimentary and are designed to provide a complete 
and comprehensive system of taxation on the purchase 
or use of tangible personal property. The tax of 2% must 
be paid to the state of Utah upon all tangible personal 
property used in this state unless specifica:lly exempted. 
It is submitted that even though the sale is to be consid-
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ered a Utah sale, and inasmuch as it is stipulated by 
counsel that no sales or use tax has been paid to the 
state of Utah or any other state upon said purchase (Tr. 
33), that the sale becomes subjeC't to the use tax. True, 
Title 80-16-4 (a), Utah Code Annotated, 1943, contains 
words which in typical legislative ambiguity presum-
ably are intended to exempt from the use tax property 
which is subject to the sales tax. As to this, we submit 
that unless the sales tax is paid either to the state or to 
the vendor, the purchase of property made in Utah be-
comes subject to the use tax. 
Be all this as it may, the sale herein involved was 
not a sale in Utah but a sale in interstate commerce. The 
contract which is an executory contract to sell the cyl-
inders was drafted and signed by the vendor, The Linde 
Air Products Company, at its New York office. This is 
clearly evidenced by the letterhead on which the con-
tract is written. (Tr. 36) 
The Linde Air products Company in submitting the 
contract to the Whitmore Oxygen Company indicated the 
terms and conditions of sale and required that Whitmore 
Oxygen Company '' * * * confirm your accep1tance of the 
foregoing terms and conditions by signing a copy of this 
letter and returning to us, whereupon it shall ccnstitute 
a contract between us." (Tr. 39) This contract w:as 
accepted by plaintiff and returned as instructed, where-
upon it became a binding contract to sell. 
No com·prehensive definition of interstate commerce 
is possible. The essential characteristic of interstate com-
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merce is the cro:-;:::~ing of 8tate lines. Interstate commerce 
includes negotiation8 for the sale of goods lo<:ated in 
another state. The Supreme Court of the United States 
in recognizing the uncertainty as to what constitutes an 
interstate sale, held that "The negotiation of sales of 
goods which are in another state, for the purpose of in-
troducing them into the state in which the negotiations 
are n1ade, is interstate commerce,'' which ''cannot be 
taxed at all'' to outside sellers or their agents. Robbilns 
r. Shelby County Tax Dist., 120 U.S. 489, 7 S. Ct. 592. 
The contract is silent as to where delivery of the 
cylinders took place. An interpretation of such a con-
tract requires an exainination of all of the terms of the 
contract provisions, the conduct of the parties, usages 
of trade and the circumstances of the case. (81-2-2 (2), 
Utah Code Annotated, 1943.) The contract herein quotes 
the purchase price of said cylinders "f.o.b. our manu-
facturing plant at Speedway, Indiana." (Tr. 36) The 
essence of an f.o.b. transaction is that title to and posses-
sion of goods are turned over from the seller to the buyer 
at the time and place that the goods are turned over 
from the seller to the carrier. When this event occurs 
the carrier becomes the agent of the buyer and the latter 
must pay the freight to point of destination. The fact 
that the record is silent as to where and when posses-
sion of the goods was taken and as to payment of freight 
charges is believed not material herein. The contract was 
available and required the same interpretation immedi-
ately after the transaction was completed as it now re-
quires. 
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While the intention of the parties wth regard to 
pas age of title is not governed by a provision to deliver 
f.o.b. point of shipment, such provision can and does 
affect de'livery and transfer of possession although title-
is retained as security for payment of the purchase price. 
An analogous situation, we believe, is where the express 
retention of title by the seller, in a contract of sale in 
order to secure payment of the purchase price, does not 
prevent its passing under an f.o.b. provision at the point 
of shipment for the purpose of a suit by the seller to 
recover the purchase price. Kilmer vs. Moneyweight 
Scale Co., 36 Ind. App. 568, 76 NE 271. Likewise we be-
lieve that the only interpretation which can be placed 
upon the f.o.b provision involved herein is that possession , 
to the goods passed and delivery occurred at Speedway, 
Indiana. 
Plaintiff makes reference to certain of the contract pro-
visions as being helpful in determining the intent of the 
parties as to whether the transaction was an Indiana or 
Utah sale. Special reference is made to paragraph 8 of 
the contract (Tr. 39. Plaintiff's brief, page 11). This 
paragraph has to do with the contract being interpreted 
and governed by the laws of Utah. While careful draft-
ing of the contract might require the inclusion of such 
a provision, it is submitted that sufficient doubt existed 
as to whether this contract was a Utah contract, one in 
interstate commerce, or an Indiana contract that the 
draftsman considered it necessary to clarify the law by 
which such contract should be governed. As pointed out 
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heretofore, the contract was sent frmn New York, ac-
cepted in Utah by plaintiff herein, and returned to New 
York whereupon it became binding as a contract to sell. 
Plaintiff cites Lazcso·n v. Tripp, 34 Utah 28, 95 P. 
3:20, as establishing the rule that "In the absence of con-
trary agreements or circu1nstances when no place of per-
fonnance is fixed by a contract, it wiU be presumed that 
the contract is to be performed where made." (Plaintiff's 
brief, page 12.) Conceding this to be the law, we submit 
that such has no application here. By the express terms 
oi the contract the vendor, Linde Air Products Company, 
had the responsibility only of delivering the cylinders 
free on board at its manufacturing plant, Speedway, 
Indiana. T.here is nothing in the contract which imposes 
any further duty of performance upon Linde Air Pro-
ducts Company. We find no provision in the contract 
which, as plaintiff points out, "* * * provides expressly 
that designated portions shall be performed at the place 
of contracting.'' Conditions imposed upon the vendee, 
i.e., keeping cylinders in good order, not to sell, mort-
gage or dispose of or permit any lien or charge to at-
tach against said cylinders, (paragraph 5 of contract, Tr. 
39); assumption of risk of loss of cylinders (paragraph 
6 of contract, Tr. 39); assumption of personal injury 
claims (paragraph 7 of contract, Tr. 39), cannot he in-
terpreted as performance in Utah on the part of the 
vendor. True, the vendor reserves the right to. repossess 
the cylinders and sell them at private or public sale 
upon default, and they further agree to deliver a bill of 
sale when the cylinders have been fully paid for under the 
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provisions of the contract (Tr. 38). However, such pro,. 
visions we submit cannot be considered as portions of 
the contract to be performed at the place of contracting. 
Plaintiff further makes reference to the provision of 
the contract (paragraph 2, Tr. 38-Plaintiff's brief, page 
12), wherein Whitmore agrees t.o pay"* * * on demand 
the amount of any sa:les, use or other excise tax, which 
we may be required to pay in connection with the cyl-
inders delivered hereunder." And concludes that, "If, 
however, the sale was intended to be an Indiana sule * * *, 
and one in interstate commerce, Linde could have no 
liability and the contract provision is meaningless.'' Such 
conclusion, we submit, is erroneous. The Linde Air Pro-
ducts Company having an agent in Utah and being 
authorized to do business within this state as a foreign 
corporation (paragraph 2, Stipulation of Facts, Tr. 32) 
would be required to collect and remit use tax to the 
state of Utah on sales made by it in interstate commerce. 
See Montgomery Ward & Co., v. State Tax Commission, 
(1941) 100 Utah 222, 112 Pac. 2d 152. 
Plaintiff cites the case of Commonwealth ·of Penn v. 
Witoil Corporation, 316 Pa. 33, 173 Atl. 404, 101 A.L.R. 
287, as being clearly in point and nearly identical in fact. 
This case is distinguishable upon three grounds. 
(a) The vendor and vendee were both located in 
the state of Pennsylvania. Wiloil Corporation was a 
Pennsylvania corporation with its principal office and 
place of business in the state of Pennsylvania. The 
vendee to whom the gasoline was sold (Ace Oil Cor-
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poration and the High Power Gasoline Co.) were both 
from Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. All of the gasoline 
was sold by \Viloil Corporation ;s agent in Phih1delphia 
to the two COinpanies named. "\Vhereas, in this case, 
while the vendor, The Linde Air Products Company, 
is qualified to do business in Utah, the contract here 
involved was not drafted in Utah, but was drafted 
in the X ew York office of the Linde Air Products Con1-
pany and 1nailed to Whitmore Oxygen Company in this 
state. 
(b) A second and more definite distinction i.s 
that the court in the \Viloil Corporation case assumed 
the fact that the sale was actually made in Pennsyl-
vania and the determination which the court was called 
upon to make was where title to the gasoline passed. It 
was contended that by the f.o.b. provision alone, the 
title passed at Wilmington, Delaware, and the court 
held that the f.o.b. provision was merely a price fixing 
provision. That this was a price fixing provision was 
shown by the fact that plaintiff's invoice, which was 
offered in evidence, contained a specific refe:rence to 
tax as follows: "Price 51hc gal. f.o.b. Wilmington, Del. 
plus 3c tax.'' Furthermore, in this case there was 
testimony by the secretary and treasurer of the Wiloil 
Corporation that it was the practice to sell gasoline 
f.o. b. certain places in order to fix the price. The trans-
action was compared to the custom of the automobile 
trade, wherein the price was quoted f.o.b. place of 
manufacture. We submit that there is nothing in the 
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record nor any assertion made to show that it is the 
custom in selling acetylene cylinders to quote prices 
f.o.b. place of manufacture. 
(c) A_ third distinction is that the tax involved 
in the Wiloil Corporation case is a gasoline tax which 
is a tax upon the first sale of gasoline within the state 
and is imposed upon the vendor. Whereas, the tax in 
this case is a use tax which may or may not be imposed 
upon the vendor which fact gives rise to extreme dif-
ference in the contract provisions in the two cases. 
The court stated with regard to this proposition: 
"If the parties contemplated that the title 
passed at Wilmington, Del., outside of Pennsyl-
vania, and the gasoline there belonged to the pur-
chasers, it is difficult to understand how the 
seller could have regarded itself as in any way 
liable for a Pennsylvania tax. * * * The sale and 
delivery of the gasoline occurred in Philadelphia. 
The fact that appellant secured the gasoline in 
Wilmington for the purpose of performing its 
contract was incidental. It was not contemplated 
by the agreement of sale that the gasoline be pro-
cured in Wilmington or any other particular 
place. The contract could have been as well per-
formed had it been procured by appellant in Penn-
sylvania. Taxation of the sale or delivery of the 
gasoline by appellant to its purchasers only re-
motely and indirectly affects interstate com-
merce.'' 
It becomes readily appar~nt that there are clearly 
distinguishable differences between the contract of sale 
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involved in the "\Viloil Corporation case and in the case 
now before the court, and said case cannot be relied upon 
to sustain plaintiff's position. 
Now, therefore, in view of the definition of ''pur-
chase," Title 80-16-2 (c), Utah Code Annotated, 1943, 
and in view of the f.o.b. provision, it is submitted that 
this contract n1ust be interpreted to be one to sell prop-
erty in interstate commerce or a sale made in Indiana, 
and that inasmuch as Whitmore purchased these cyl-
inders for use in Utah, that the use tax and not the 
sales tax applies to said purchases. 
3. In the event the sale is determined to be an In-
diana sale, the third contention of plaintiff that the pur-
chase is specifically exempt pursuant to provision 80-
16-4 (d), Utah Code Annotated, 1943, may be summarily 
dealt with. Plaintiff's indication, set forth in its brief on 
page 15, that there is ample authority that a transaction 
such as the Whitmore-Linde sale is not taxable in In-
diana, is correct. An examination of the Indiana Gross 
Income Tax Act (Acts of Indiana, 1933, ch. 50), (Burns 
Ind. Statutes Annotated, 1933, sec. 64, 2601-64-2630), 
as amended, as such tax act was in effect during the 
years in question, and the cases decided thereunder in-
dicates clearly that such transaction was not subject to 
the Indiana tax. See J. D. Adams Mfg. Co. v. W~lliam 
Svoren (1937) 304 U.S. 307, 82 L. Ed. 1365, which held, 
as set forth in the syllabus, that: 
''A state gross income tax (Indiana Gross 
Income Tax Act of 1933) imposes an unconstitu-
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tional burden on interstate and foreign commerce 
when applied to the gross receipts of a corpora-
tion which, although its factory and principal 
place of business is within the state, sells most of 
its products to customers in other states and 
foreign countries, where the tax is imposed on the 
total gross receipts of the corporation, whether 
fron1 business within or without the state, in-
discrilninately and without apportionment." 
It is believed, however, that such is not the solution to 
the problem presented. As indicated by plaintiff, the Tax 
Cornmission has long interpreted the words ''subject 
to" as found in Title 80-16-4 (d), Utah Code Annotated, 
1943, as meaning ''subject to and actually paid.'' This, 
we submit, is a practical and in fact the only effective in-
terpretation which can be placed upon this section. In-
sisting that sales tax actually be paid to a sister state is 
the only method by which the Tax Commission can de-
termine with certainty and definiteness that the ~ale was 
subject to the tax in another state. 
The Tax Commission cannot be called upon to in-
terpret aU of the laws of the various states which im-
pose a sales tax upon sales of tangible personal property. 
The exemption exempting property upon which a tax 
already has been paid to another state is indeed a wise 
and equitable exemption. Such provision eliminates the 
possibility of interstate commerce being subjected to an 
unfair burden. If, however, a tax is not paid to a sister 
state, the transaction is not in fact subjected to such dis-
crimination but is put upon the same basis as sales made 
in intrastate commerce. It is admittedly true that a 1nis-
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interpretation of the statute gives no regularity to such 
interpretation. However, this court in the case of Board 
of Sta:fte Land Commissioners v. Ririe, (1920) 56 Utah 
213, 190 P. 59, said: 
· · \Yhile it is true that the construction of a 
statute by the executive ·department is not bind-
ing upon the courts, it is, nevertheless, a]so true, 
and is so determined by the overwhelming weight 
of authority, that unless such construction does 
violence to the apparent intent of the language 
used it is entitled to serious consideration by the 
courts, and especially so if the statute has been 
in force for any great length of time and has been 
so construed.'' 
This state1nent of the law was acquiesced in by this court 
in In re Cou·an's Estate, (1940) 98 U. 393, 99 Pac. 2d 
605, and was reaffirmed in the case of Utah Concrete 
Products Co. v. Sta.te Tax Commission, (1942) 101 U. 
513, 125 P. 2d 408. 
The interpretation placed by the State Tax Commis- · 
sion upon the words ''subject to'' has been in effect 
since 1937 when the Use Tax Act was first passed. And 
it is submitted such interpretation does no violence to 
the apparent intent of the language, the intent being to 
eliminate the possibility that both a sales and use tax 
would be paid on the same transaction. 
In view of the impossibility of the Commission de-
termining whether another state l~w subjects a sales 
transaction to tax and the fact that the Commission has 
long held that the tax must be paid to a sister state in or-
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der for the transaction to be exempt here, it is submitted 
that the contention of plaintiff as to question three be 
held for naught and the position of the Tax Commission 
sustained. 
CONCLUSION 
In conclusion the defendant, State Tax Com1nission, 
respectfully submits that in view of the authorities cited 
and the arguments presented herein that this court should 
deny petitioner's claim that the filing of form TC 71 en-
titled ''Sales and Use Tax Return'' in which the use tax 
portion of the return was left blank is a return suffi-
cient to start the running of the period of the statute 
of limitation, and this court should likewise deny the 
petitioner's claim that the Whitmore-Linde contract evi-
dences a sale made in Utah, and the defendant further 
submits that in view of the long standing interpretation 
of Title 80-16-4 (a), Utah Code Annotated, 1943, that 
this court should deny petitioner's claim that if a sale 
is subject to a tax, that such sale is exempt irrespective 
of the fact that no tax is paid to the other state. 
WHEREFORE, defendants pray that the decision 
heretofore rendered by the Tax Commission in this 
matter be affirmed and judgment rendered accordingly. 
Respectfully submited, 
G. HAL TAYLOR, 
Attorney for Defendants. 
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